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Abstract:

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether both country
disclosure environment and firm-level disclosures are associated with
cross-listing in the USA or London or otherwise.

Design/methodology/approach – The authors test the association
using a sample of Asia-Pacific firms covered in the Standard and
Poor's, 2001/2002 disclosure survey, capturing the country-level
disclosure using the Center for International Financial Analysis and
Research (CIFAR) score. The firm-level disclosure is measured
using the S&P disclosure score. The authors conduct a logistic
regression analysis and a two-stage least squares analysis to
examine whether the outcome, cross-listing or not, is associated
with the country disclosure environment and firm-level disclosures.
Findings – The authors find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak
disclosure environments and having higher firm-level disclosure
scores are more likely to seek listing in the USA. Further, the paper
provides initial evidence that these Asia-Pacific firms are as likely to
seek listing in London as in the USA. No significant difference was
found in S&P scores between US and London cross-listings after
controlling for the effects of other variables. This suggests that
firms that cross-list in London present similar disclosure levels to
firms that cross-list in the USA.
Originality/value – The paper's findings contribute to the crosslisting literature on disclosure by showing that the interaction
between firm-level disclosure and country-level disclosure has an
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impact on whether a firm cross-lists in the USA/London or not. The
authors' comparison of US cross-listings versus London crosslistings provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and
London cross-listings are not significantly different.
Introduction
This paper examines the association between disclosures and crosslisting using a sample of Asia-Pacific firms. Foreign companies have
a long history of seeking a US satisfy their capital demand (Reese
and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al. , 2005). Cross-listing improves
cross-listed firms' information environment. More analysts follow
these firms than non-cross-listed firms and analysts provide more
accurate forecasts for these firms (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al.,
2003). Moreover, cost of capital decreases for cross-listed firms
(Baker et al., 2002). Cross-listed firms enjoy a valuation premium
(Doidge et al., 2004). Benefits such as these attract firms to crosslist in the USA. However, these benefits come at the cost of
increased disclosures. Cross-listing in the USA requires that foreign
firms meet the disclosure requirements of the US capital market.
Prior literature (Mittoo, 1992) shows that the major cost of crosslisting is from complying with the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). This implies that firms that
already provide high levels of disclosure face lower incremental
compliance cost to cross-list in the USA. It will be interesting to
examine whether firms' disclosure levels are associated with their
cross-listing choices given the disclosure environment at home.
Specifically, whether the home country Center for International
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) score and a firm's
Standard & Poor (S&P) disclosure score and their interaction are
associated with the firm being cross-listed in the USA, London, or
otherwise.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing
on a sample of Asia-Pacific firms. Prior studies show that the
location of and the familiarity to the firm affect investor interest in
the firm (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Coval
and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic and
Weisbenner, 2005; Chan et al., 2005). Selecting a sample of firms
from one region, we are able to control for regional and cultural
influences that may affect cross-listing choices. Second, we examine
cross-listings in London as well as in the USA. Prior studies (Hope
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et al., 2007) focus exclusively on cross-listings in the USA.
However, London is also a major world financial market and firms
seek cross-listing there as well. Our data allow us to investigate
whether there are differences between cross-listings in London and
in the USA. Third, we extend prior research by examining the
interaction between firm- and country-level disclosures. Many prior
studies examine the difference in the country-level disclosure of
firms that cross-list and those that do not cross-list in the USA. The
country-level disclosure research assigns a single score to all firms
of a country. It assumes that all firms from the country provide the
same level of disclosure. However, this is not necessarily true. The
S&P disclosure scores, a firm-level disclosure measure, indicate that
firms from the same country present various levels of disclosure.
For example, S&P concludes that the disclosure scores of Korean
firms are spread between 5 and 62.89 (Table, panel B). Thus, it is
important to examine both country- and firm-level disclosures in
cross-listing decisions.
Following prior literature (Doidge et al., 2004; Hope et al.,
2007), we use CIFAR scores as the proxy for country disclosure
environment. We further define countries with an above (below)
median CIFAR score a high (low) disclosure environment. Our
sample includes 416 firms with both CIFAR score and S&P
2001/2002 firm score. As of June 2005, 46 per cent of them are
cross-listed in the USA and/or London. Specifically, 130 are crosslisted in the USA and 103 in London. We use a logistic regression
model to examine the association between disclosures and crosslisting. As expected, we find that the association between crosslisting and firm-level disclosure is affected by the home country
disclosure environment. We find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak
disclosure environments are more likely to seek cross-listing in the
USA. We also find no significant difference in the S&P scores
between US and London cross-listings after controlling for the
effects of other variables.
[Table 1]
We conclude that firms that cross-list in London provide similar
levels of disclosure as firms that cross-list in the USA. Our
comparison of US cross-listings versus London cross-listings
provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and London crosslistings are not significantly different. This is consistent with prior
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research that UK firms have quality financial reporting. Cheng and
Lin (2009) find that UK firms choose not to recognize good news
unless it has been supported by both superior market performance
and the industry norm.
While we test for the impact of S&P disclosure on crosslisting, it is also possible that cross-listing may affect S&P
disclosure. Hence, we run two-stage least squares regressions to
control for the possible problem of endogeneity. The main results
show that the CIFAR score is not significant but S&P score is higher
for firms cross-listed in the USA, and S&P scores have a greater
positive impact on the choice of cross-listing in the USA for firms
from low CIFAR score countries than firms from high CIFAR score
countries. This suggests that these cross-listing firms differentiate
themselves through having higher firm-level disclosures. As a
sensitivity test, we reclassify our sample firms as exchange-listed or
not exchange-listed. Our inferences are not changed. Therefore, we
conclude that our finding can be generalized to both cross-listing
and exchange listing. We further examine the three components of
the S&P scores. Of the three component scores, the financial
transparency and information disclosure score significantly
interacts with the country disclosure environment in explaining
cross-listing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews prior literature and presents our hypothesis. Section 3
describes our model and sample. The results are reported in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and hypothesis
Prior research suggests that foreign firms benefits from crosslisting. Baker et al. (2002) report that firms attract more analysts
after they are cross-listed and they find that cross-listed firms
experience a decrease in cost of capital. Lang et al. (2003) also
observe an increase in analyst following for cross-listed firms. They
find that analyst forecasts are more accurate for cross-listed firms
than for non-cross-listed firms. The change in analyst following and
forecast accuracy has a positive effect on market valuation. Doidge
et al. (2004) find that the Tobin's Q of cross-listed firms is 16.5 per
cent higher than that of non-cross-listed firms from the same
country. In addition, the valuation premium is higher for firms that
list on the major US exchanges and lower for firms that list overInternational Journal of Accounting and Information Management Vol. 20, No. 1 (November, 2012): pg. 6-25.
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the-counter or placed privately. Cross-listing enhances firms' ability
to issue equity, which relaxes the constraints on their capital (Reese
and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al., 2005).
Many of the benefits above relate to disclosure. Studies on
firm-level disclosures show that higher levels of disclosure reduce
the cost of following the firm (Merton, 1987), estimation risk (Barry
and Brown, 1985), and/or information asymmetry (Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985). Firms in Southeast Asia with high disclosure
quality outperformed firms with low disclosure quality during the
1997-1998 financial crisis (Mitton, 2002). Foreign firms that adopt
accounting methods that comply with US Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles attract more US institutional investors and
exhibit higher US ownership (Bradshaw et al., 2004). Companies in
emerging markets work on financial reporting and disclosure,
trying to reduce the barriers to accessing global equity markets
(Frost et al., 2006).
Research shows that the cost associated with increasing
disclosure is a concern for cross-listing decisions. Mittoo's (1992)
survey reveals the main costs of cross-listing perceived by Canadian
firms: meeting the SEC reporting/compliance requirements,
legal/accounting/investment banking fees, and listing fees.
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) examine cross-listings on nine major
exchanges. These countries are ranked based on their disclosure
levels. The disclosure of a firm is proxied by the ranking of its home
country. They find that firms are more likely to list on exchanges
with lower disclosure requirements than their home country.
Similar findings are obtained in Pagano et al. (2001) who examine
the cross-listing decisions of European public firms between 1986
and 1997. They find that European firms are less likely to cross-list
in target countries that have higher accounting standards. Miller
(1999) compares the accounting standards, SEC registration, and
costs of listing in the USA. Firms on the major US exchanges face
higher costs and more stringent disclosure requirements. He shows
that only 29 per cent of foreign firms chose to list on the major US
exchanges during 1985-1995.
If firms are concerned about the cost of increased disclosure,
we expect that firms with a high level of disclosure are more likely
to cross-list. This is because the incremental cost of disclosure is
less for them than for firms with a low disclosure level. A positive
association between firm-level disclosure and the probability of
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cross-listing should be observed. However, Hope et al. (2007)
report that the firm-level disclosure is positively related to exchange
listing but not significantly related to the broader cross-listing.
Frost et al. (2006, table 8) do not find an association between firmlevel disclosure and the probability of cross-listing versus noncross-listing, the probability of cross-listing in the USA versus
cross-listing in the UK or not cross-listing, or the probability of
exchange listing in the USA or trading under Rule 144a in the USA
versus otherwise. We expect this phenomenon to be explained by
the interaction between country- and firm-level disclosures.
Coffee (1999, 2002) proposes the bonding theory to explain
cross-listing. The bonding theory suggests that firms commit to less
expropriation of minority shareholders by voluntarily subjecting
themselves to higher disclosure standards and stronger monitoring.
Cross-listing in the US market, a market widely recognized as
having high disclosure requirements and strong public scrutiny,
demonstrates the commitment. Reese and Weisbach (2002) report
that cross-listing firms from countries with weak investor
protection increase their equity issues more than their counterpart
from countries with strong investor protection do. Doidge et al.
(2004) find that cross-listing firms enjoy a higher valuation
premium than firms from the same country that do not cross-list.
The valuation premium is higher (lower) where the level of investor
protection in the firm's home country is lower (higher). Separating
the bonding effect of disclosure from that of investor rights, Hope et
al. (2007) find that firms from weaker disclosure countries are
more likely to cross-list in the USA. The valuation premium to
exchange-listing firms is higher for firms from a high disclosure
country than those from a low disclosure country. These results
suggest that the firm's home country investor protection and
disclosure environment matter.
If a firm's home country already requires a high level of
disclosure and the purpose of cross-listing in the USA is to show a
commitment to protect minority investors, the benefits from
bonding will be less for firms from a high disclosure country than
for firms from a low disclosure country. The positive association
between firm-level disclosure and the probability of cross-listing in
the USA will be moderated by the firm's home country disclosure
level. Therefore, we expect there is an interaction between firm- and
country-level disclosures. Our test hypothesis is as follows:
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H1.

Firms from weak disclosure environments and with
high firm-level disclosure scores are more likely to
cross-list in the USA.

3. Model and sample
To examine our hypothesis on the association between cross-listing
in the USA and the interaction of country-level disclosure
environment and firm-level disclosure scores, we run the following
model:

where:
Usind

is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is crosslisted in the USA, and 0 otherwise.

CIFAR

is the disclosure score for the country in which the
firm operates, data obtained from Hope et al. (2007).

S&P score

is the firm-level disclosure score based on the 2000
annual report.

CIF

is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home
country has a CIFAR score above the median, and 0
otherwise.

Emerging

is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home
country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise.

Anti-dir

is a measure of anti-director rights in the home
country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).

Judicial

is a measure of judicial rights in the home country,
data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).

French

is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home
country's law system is French based, and 0
otherwise.

German

is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home
country's law system is German based, and 0
otherwise; the base law system is English.
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Liquidity

is the liquidity of the capital market in the home
country, data obtained from Hope et al. (2007).

LogGNP

is the logarithm of the gross national product of the
country in which the firm operates.

Leverage

is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders' equity of the
firm.

Growth

is measured as the change in the assets of the firm in
year t.

Size

is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm.

The S&P score measures the disclosure level of the sample firm by
S&P (Patel et al., 2002). The S&P 2001/2002 survey examines the
annual reports (both in English and the local language) of the
company for the year 2000. It assigns each firm a disclosure score
based on the presence of the applicable information items. These 98
information items cover ownership structure and investor relations
(28 items, Sub score 1), financial transparency and information
disclosure (35 items, Sub score 2), and board and management
structure and process (35 items, Sub score 3). As high disclosure
level firms incur low incremental cost to cross-list, we expect S&P
score to be positively associated with USind. The CIFAR score
measures a country's disclosure environment. CIF is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the CIFAR score is above the median, and 0
otherwise. Firms from countries with weak disclosure environments
are more likely to cross-list in the USA (Hope et al., 2007). In
accordance with our hypothesis, CIF * S&P score will be negatively
associated with USind. Emerging is a variable that indicates
whether the country is an emerging economy as defined by the
International Monetary Fund (2007) in its World Economic
Outlook report. We include this variable in the model because
previous research shows that firms from emerging markets and
firms from developed markets are different. Cross-listing to gain
access to external financial markets is more important to the former
than to the latter (Lins et al., 2005). Anti-Dir and Judicial are
scores that measure protection of minority interests (La Porta et al.,
1998). Firms in countries with weak protection of minority interests
are more likely to seek cross-listing to signal quality. Firms under
French -or German -based law systems are less likely to seek crossInternational Journal of Accounting and Information Management Vol. 20, No. 1 (November, 2012): pg. 6-25.
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listing in the USA because their public enforcement is not as
effective to protect investor rights as private enforcement in the
common law system (La Porta et al., 2006). We use Liquidity as a
proxy for the development of the home country capital market. We
expect the coefficient on Liquidity to be positive. Firms that come
from weak disclosure environments are also expected to have lower
GNP. This controls for the influence of home country economic
conditions. Leverage, Growth and Size are firm-specific
characteristics. We expect cross-listed firms to have lower leverage,
higher growth and to be larger in size.
Table I, panel A reports how we obtained our sample. The
sample starts with the S&P 2001/2002 disclosure survey with firms
from Asia-Pacific, emerging Asia, and Japan. In total, we have 502
firms, including 33 firms counted twice in the survey. We further
exclude 33 firms from Bermuda, China, and Indonesia that do not
have CIFAR scores, and 20 firms with missing data. We next check
firm cross-listing status from Bank of New York, Citibank and JP
Morgan American Depositary Receipt (ADR) datasets, and NYSE,
NASDAQ, OTC, and London Stock Exchange web sites. As of June
2005, we have 130 and 103 firms listed in the USA and London,
respectively; 42 of them are listed in both the USA and London. The
remaining 225 firms are not cross-listed in the USA or London. A
limitation of our sample is that these firms are pre-selected by S&P,
but together these firms represent 67-80 per cent of their home
country's market capitalization (Patel et al., 2002; Standard &
Poor's, 2007a, b). Therefore, these firms are the most likely to
access foreign capital markets.
Table I, panel B reports the range of the S&P disclosure
scores, CIFAR scores, number of cross-listed firms, and the
distribution of the sample by country. The lowest S&P score is 5 for
a firm in Korea, and the highest score is 77 for a firm in Singapore.
In this sample, Taiwan has the lowest CIFAR score (58) and
Australia has the highest CIFAR score (80). More firms cross-list in
the USA than in London. Countries that have a fair number of firms
cross-listed in London are Japan, India, and Korea. We extend prior
studies to examine whether firm-level disclosure scores, in addition
to CIFAR scores, may explain firm's cross-listing choice.
Table II provides descriptive statistics for firms cross-listed
in the USA (panel A), the London Stock Exchange (Panel B), and
non-cross-listed firms (Panel C). The statistics show that firms
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cross-listed in the USA have a lower mean CIFAR score (69.431)
and S&P score (47.448) than firms cross-listed in London (69.563
and 51.880, respectively). Non-cross-listed firms have a mean
CIFAR score of 70.373 and S&P score of 45.548.
[Table II]
The non-cross-listed group has a higher proportion of firms from
emerging economies than the cross-listed groups. US cross-listings
and London cross-listings exhibit higher investor protection rights
(anti-director rights and judicial rights) at home than non-crosslisted firms. The US cross-listings have the most liquid home capital
market. Firms cross-listed in the USA have lower leverage, higher
growth, and are larger in size than non-cross-listed firms.
4. Results
Table III, panel A presents the correlation analyses between the
indicator variable of US listing and the explanatory variables. The
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are in the upper
(lower) diagonal. Both sets of coefficients are qualitatively similar.
We report the results based on the Spearman correlation
coefficients. For our sample, Anti-dir (coefficient=0.114, pvalue=0.020) is positively correlated with USind , consistent with
[7], [8] Coffee (1999, 2002). The correlation coefficient between
CIFAR and USind is negative but not significant (coefficient=0.017, p -value=0.726). The firm-level S&P score is positively but
not significantly correlated with USind (coefficient=0.058, p value=0.240). Other variables that significantly correlate with
USind are Emerging (coefficient=-0.090, p -value=0.068), Growth
(coefficient=0.219, p -value < 0.0001), and Size (coefficient=0.328,
p -value < 0.0001). They indicate that firms listed in the USA tend
to have higher anti-director rights, are less likely to be from
emerging economies, are growth firms, and larger in size.
Table III, panel B focuses on the Pearson (upper diagonal)
and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation analyses between the
indicator variable of London listing and the explanatory variables.
The correlations show that Judicial and S&P score are significantly
and positively correlated with the London listing indicator. Firms
that cross-list in London are also less likely to be from emerging
economies (coefficient = -0.274, p -value = <0.0001). They show
high leverage (coefficient = 0.161, p -value = 0.003).
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In Table IV [Figure omitted. See Article Image.], we present
the test of differences in CIFAR scores, S&P disclosure scores, and
other variables by cross-listing choice. Panel A compares firms
cross-listed only in the USA (n =88) or in London (n =61); we
eliminate firms that are cross-listed on both the US and London
exchanges. The mean CIFAR score of firms cross-listed in the USA
(69.682) is lower but not significantly different than that of firms
cross-listed in London (70.016). The univariate analysis shows that
the mean S&P score of US cross-listings (45.691) is lower than that
of London cross-listings (52.395). Other variables that are
significantly different between US and London listings are
Emerging, Judicial, Liquidity, GNP, Leverage, Growth and Size.
London cross-listings consist of firms from countries with higher
judicial rights, less liquid capital market, and higher GNP. These
firms present higher leverage, lower growth, and are smaller in size
than those cross-listed in the USA.
[Table III]
[Table IV]
Panel B compares firms cross-listed in the USA (n =130) and
non-cross-listed firms (n =225). Firms that cross-list in both the
USA and London are included in the US sample. The mean CIFAR
score of US cross-listings (69.431) is lower but not significantly
different than the mean CIFAR score of non-cross-listed firm
(70.373). However, US cross-listings have higher firm-level S&P
disclosure scores than non-cross-listed firms (47.448 versus
45.548). Significant differences in several other variables are also
observed. The non-cross-listed firms have a higher percentage of
firms coming from the emerging economies than those cross-listed
in the USA (0.440 versus 0.269). US cross-listings experience
higher growth, are larger in size, and have better investor protection
at home than non-cross-listed firms.
Logistic regression
In Table V, panel A, column (I) examines the association between
USind and country CIFAR score. This model controls for the effects
of other country-level variables such as Emerging, Anti-dir,
Judicial, French, German, Liquidity, and LogGNP. The coefficient
on CIFAR score is significantly negative (ß1 =-0.122, t -statistic =
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-2.854), consistent with Hope et al. (2007) that firms with low
country disclosure scores are more likely to list in the USA. It
suggests that cross-listing in the USA may be a means for firms
from low CIFAR score countries to signal their quality. Other
variables significantly associated with US cross-listing are
Emerging (ß4 =-3.515, t -statistic =-5.404) and German (ß8 =
-3.081, t -statistic =-3.271). They suggest that firms cross-listed in
the USA are less likely to be from emerging economies, and are less
likely to be from German-based law systems.
Model (1) in column (II) examines the association between
US listing (USind ) and CIFAR score, firm S&P disclosure score,
and the interaction of CIFAR indicator and S&P score (CIF*S&P
score ). The coefficient on CIFAR score is significantly negative (ß1
=-0.297, t -statistic =-2.664). The coefficient on S&P score is not
significant. The coefficient on CIF* S&P score is 0.07 (t -statistic
=2.558). Firms from emerging economies and German-based law
systems are less likely to cross-list in the USA. Firms that cross-list
in the USA have lower leverage and are larger than firms not crosslisting in the USA. The results here partially support our hypothesis
that firms from a weak disclosure environment (low CIFAR score)
are more likely to cross-list, but do not indicate a significant effect
of firm-level disclosure score (S&P score). This may be due to the
endogeneity between cross-listing and S&P score. In Table VI, we
conduct a simultaneous equation system analysis to control for
endogeneity.
In Table V, panel B, we examine whether there are
differences in disclosures between US cross-listings and London
cross-listings. We run a logistic regression analysis of model (1)
with an indicator variable for US versus London cross-listings. After
controlling for the effect of other variables, the results show no
significant difference in CIFAR and S&P scores between US and
London cross-listings. We conclude that firms that cross-list in
London have similar disclosure levels as firms that cross-list in the
USA. Unlike prior literature ( Lang et al., 2003; Hope et al., 2007)
that primarily examines US cross-listings and non-US crosslistings, our comparison of US cross-listings versus London crosslistings provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and
London cross-listings are not significantly different.
Simultaneous equations
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Thus, far, our analysis is premised on firm disclosure affecting
cross-listing choice. However, cross-listing in the USA may
subsequently affect a firm's disclosure score. That is, there is
endogeneity between cross-listing and disclosure score. We run our
analysis again using a two-stage least squares regression with an
instrumental variable estimator for the firm disclosure score. Our
simultaneous equations consist of our model (1) repeated here:
[Table V]
[Table VI]

We control the effect that cross-listing in the USA may impact the
S&P firm disclosure scores. We regress S&P 2001/2002 disclosure
score on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed
in the USA, and 0 otherwise[1]. Table VI presents the results from
the two-stage least squares regression. Panel A presents the results
of model (1). Our results here show that CIFAR score is not
significant but S&P score is significantly positive. S&P score is
higher for firms cross-listed in the USA (ß 2 =0.380, t -statistic
=2.55) and S&P scores have a greater positive impact on the choice
of cross-listing in the USA for firms from low CIFAR score countries
than firms from high CIFAR score countries (ß3 =-0.083, t -statistic
=-1.91). Firms cross-listing in the USA have higher anti-director
rights and capital market liquidity at home. Panel B presents the
results of model (2). The coefficient on US cross-listing indicator
variable is significantly positive (coefficient =3.669, t -statistic
=3.72). Cross-listing in the USA impacts the S&P scores in
2001/2002. CIFAR score also positively impacts S&P score. The
anti-director rights score is negatively associated with the
disclosure score and the judicial right score is not significant.
Disclosure scores are lower for firms that follow the French-based
law system than the English-based system. They are higher for
firms from a less liquid home market and from a high GNP country.
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Additional analyses
Exchange listing
We next run a two-stage analysis with our observations classified as
exchange-listed or not. Exchange listing imposes stricter disclosure
requirements than cross-listing which includes over-the-counter
and pink sheets. The results remain qualitatively similar. In Table
VII under model (1a), CIFAR score (ß 1 =0.347, t -statistic =3.11)
and S&P score (ß2 =0.225, t -statistic =3.80) are higher for firms
exchange-listed in the USA. S&P scores have a greater positive
impact on the choice of exchange listing in the USA for firms from
low CIFAR score countries than firms from high CIFAR score
countries (ß3 =-0.109, t -statistic =-3.31). The results support our
hypothesis.
Components of S&P score
We also run the two-stage analysis with components of the S&P
disclosure score. The three components are: Sub score 1 , the firmlevel disclosure score on ownership structure and investor
relations; Sub score 2 , the firm-level disclosure score on financial
transparency and information disclosure; and Sub score 3 , the
firm-level disclosure score on board management structure and
processes. The results are presented in Table VII under models
(1b)-(d), respectively. The results remain similar for Sub score 2 (ß1
=0.904, t -statistic =1.88, ß2 =0.505, t -statistic =2.02, and ß3 =
-0.219, t -statistic =-1.93). The results of interest are not significant
for Sub score 1 or Sub score 3. Thus, Asia-Pacific firms with high
financial transparency and information disclosures and from low
country disclosure environments are particularly more likely to
cross-list in the USA.
[Table VII]
5. Conclusion
This paper examines whether cross-listing in the USA is associated
with both country disclosure environment and firm disclosure level.
The sample consists of firms in the Asia-Pacific region that are
reported on the S&P 2001/2002 disclosure survey. We measure the
US listing using a dichotomous variable. We measure the countrylevel disclosure using the CIFAR score and firm-level disclosure
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using the S&P disclosure score. Coffee (1999, 2002) and other
studies suggest that firms will cross-list to an environment with
stronger investor protections to signal their quality. A similar
phenomenon exists with respect to disclosure. Our evidence shows
that Asia-Pacific firms from a weak disclosure environment are
more likely to cross-list in the USA, consistent with Hope et al.
(2007). Additionally, we find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak
disclosure environments and having higher firm-level disclosure
scores are more likely to seek listing in the USA. Further, we
provide initial evidence that Asia-Pacific firms from weak disclosure
environments and with high firm disclosures are as likely to seek
listing in London as in the USA.
This paper presents preliminary evidence that a firm's crosslisting decision is influenced by both country- and firm-level
disclosures. One limitation of this paper is that our sample includes
only the firms covered by the S&P survey and they are large, so our
results may not be generalizable to smaller firms. Our paper is also
subject to the limitation that we are unable to obtain firm-level
disclosures at the time the firm cross-listed. We are making the
assumption that the disclosure level during the S&P 2001/2002
survey is not much different than that at the time of cross-listing.
An examination of the contemporaneous association between
disclosure level and cross-listing choice may be conducted in future
research when time-series data on firm-level disclosure are
available. Future research may also examine the consequences of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on cross-listings in the USA versus London
and other world stock markets. This research may also be extended
to examine whether disclosure environments and firm-level
disclosures are associated with cross-listing in the USA or London
for firms from Europe, Latin America, and other regions of the
world.
Note
1. As our S&P disclosure scores are for 2000 annual reports, we run the analyses
again for firms cross-listed in the USA before 2001. We obtain similar results.
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Table 1.
Panel A: selection of final sample
Number of Asia-Pacific, emerging Asia and
Japan firms covered by S&P 500
Less: duplicate firms/disclosure scores
Less: firms without CIFAR scores
Less: firms with missing data
Number of firms in sample 416
Cross-listing status of sample firms
US cross-listings (NYSE, NASDAQ and
OTC)
London cross-listings
Both US and London cross-listings
(counted twice)
Total number of firms cross-listed
Not cross-listed
Number of firms in sample

502
33a
33b
20

130
103
(42)
191c
225
416

46%
54%
100%

Panel B: S&P disclosure scores, CIFAR scores, and cross-listing by country
Range in
S&P score

Country
Australia
Hong Kong
India
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Phillippines
Singapore
Thailand
Taiwan
Total

40-71
44-55
20.21-62.37
48-67
5-62.89
35.11-62.77
24.47-48.94
12.21-37.76
50-77
20.21-65.98
14.89-38

CIFAR
scored

80
73
61
71
68
79
73
64
79
66
58

US crosslisting

19
17
20
22
14
4
0
2
3
7
6
103

London cross- Both the USA
listing
and London

5
1
11
71
11
0
0
0
0
0
0
103

5
0
7
19
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
42

Number
of firms

26
20
41
138
47
51
1
10
9
11
27
416

Notes: aThese 33 firms appeared in both the Asia-Pacific and Emerging Asia lists; bwe did
not find CIFAR scores for firms in Bermuda, China and Indonesia; cthis total indicates the
number of cross-listings found using data from Bank of New York, Citibank, JP Morgan,
NYSE, NASDAQ, OTC and London Stock Exchange web sites; dCIFAR scores are obtained
from Hope et al. (2007)
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Table II. Descriptive statistics of the variables by listing
Variable
Panel A: US cross-listings
CIFAR
S&P score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
Liquidity
GNP
Leverage
Growth
Size
Panel B: London crosslistings
CIFAR
S&P score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
Liquidity
GNP
Leverage
Growth
Size
Panel C: non-crosslisted firms
CIFAR
S&P score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
Liquidity
GNP
Leverage
Growth
Size

n

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130

69.431
47.448
0.269
3.846
8.321
1.230
1,054.150
3.429
0.116
10.137

7.432
15.386
0.445
1.023
2.001
1.355
1,706.680
8.353
0.286
2.516

58.000
5.208
0.000
2.000
3.250
0.350
64.600
255.274
20.794
5.569

80.000
77.320
5.000
5.000
10.000
4.620
4,812.100
59.030
2.117
17.752

103
103
103
103
103
103
103
103
103
103

69.563
51.880
0.107
3.864
9.233
0.779
3,438.600
3.815
0.086
8.947

4.506
9.724
0.310
0.755
1.406
0.893
2,056.380
8.177
0.267
2.997

58.000
15.957
0.000
2.000
6.000
0.430
163.800
255.274
20.794
5.569

80.000
67.742
1.000
5.000
10.000
4.620
4,812.100
59.030
2.117
17.589

225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225

70.373
45.548
0.440
3.560
7.899
1.055
1,539.960
3.803
0.073
8.693

6.579
12.29=05
0.497
0.972
2.230
1.157
2,071.740
10.645
0.270
2.721

58.000
13.830
0.000
2.000
3.250
0.350
59.500
255.274
20.794
3.222

80.000
71.277
1.000
5.000
10.000
4.620
4,812.100
136.115
2.117
17.213

Notes: CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates;
S&P score is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-Dir is
a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et
al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained
from La Porta et al. (1998); Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the
home country; GNP is gross national product of the country in which the firm
operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets
of the firm in year t; Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm
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Table III.
Panel A: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation
analyses of US listings and explanatory variables (correlation coefficient,p-value)
Usind

Usind

CIFAR

S&P
score

Emerging Anti-dir Judicial Leverage Growth

Size

1.000

-0.062 0.016
-0.090 0.097 0.012 -0.041 0.157
0.280
0.207 0.747
0.068 0.048 0.804 0.454 0.004 <0.0001
CIFAR -0.017
1.000 0.576
-0.036 0.235 0.512
0.031
-0.036 -0.422
0.726
<0.0001 0.464 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.569 0.513
<0.0001
S&P
0.058
0.443 1.000 -0.259 0.118
0.433 -0.008 0.002 -0.296
score
0.240 <0.0001
<0.0001 0.016 <0.0001 0.879 0.976 <0.0001
Emerging -0.090 -0.072 -0.333
1.000 0.151
-0.426 0.074 0.141
-0.027
0.068
0.140 <0.0001 0.002 <0.0001 0.182
0.011
0.588
Anti-dir 0.114
0.343 0.043
0.205 1.000 0.676 -0.102 0.053 -0.499
0.020 <0.0001 0.383
<0.0001
<0.0001 0.064 0.338 <0.0001
Judicial 0.017
0.594 0.509 -0.524 0.521
1.000 -0.102 -0.149 -0.590
0.726 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.065
0.007 <0.0001
Leverage -0.072
0.051 0.218
-0.010 -0.086 0.020
1.000 -0.053
0.144
0.191
0.352 <0.0001 0.855 0.122 0.723
0.245
0.009
Growth 0.219
-0.050 -0.021
0.221 0.095 -0.186 -0.004 1.000
0.168
<0.0001 0.364
0.701 <0.0001 0.086 0.001
0.932
0.002
Size
0.328 -0.498 -0.317
0.078 -0.329 -0.663 0.177 0.246
1.000
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.113 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.001 <0.0001
Panel B: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation analyses of
London listings and explanatory variables (correlation coefficient, p-value)
London

London 1.000

CIFAR

S&P
score

Emerging Anti-dir

Judicial Leverage Growth

-0.041 0.211
-0.274 0.094
0.259 0.035
0.404 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.057 <0.0001 0.525
CIFAR -0.035 1.000 0.576
-0.036 0.235
0.512
0.031
0.475
-0.0001 0.464 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.569
S&P
0.236
0.443 1.000 -0.259 0.118
0.433 -0.008
score <0.0001 <0.0001
<0.0001 0.016 <0.0001 0.879
Emerging-0.274 -0.072 -0.333
1.000 0.151
-0.426 0.074
<0.0001 0.140 <0.0001
0.002 <0.0001 0.182
Anti-dir 0.078
0.343 0.043
0.205 1.000
0.676 -0.102
0.113 <0.0001 0.383 <0.0001
<0.0001 0.064
Judicial 0.290
0.594 0.509
-0.524 0.521
1.000 -0.102
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
0.065
Leverage0.161
0.051 0.218
-0.010 -0.086 0.020 1.000
0.003
0.352 <0.0001 0.855 0.122
0.723
Growth -0.076 -0.050 -0.021
0.221 0.095 -0.186 -0.004
0.173
0.364 0.701 <0.0001 0.086
0.001 0.932
Size
-0.077
-0.498 -0.317
0.078 -0.329 -0.663 0.177
0.117 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.113 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.001

Size

-0.059 -0.017
0.291 0.731
-0.036 -0.422
0.513 <0.0001
0.002 -0.296
0.976 <0.0001
0.141 -0.027
0.011 0.588
0.053 -0.499
0.338 <0.0001
-0.149 -0.590
0.007 <0.0001
-0.053 0.144
0.245 0.009
1.000 0.168
0.002
0.246 1.000
<0.0001

Notes: USind is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA,
and 0 otherwise; London is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is listed on the
London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in
which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise;
Anti-Dir is a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta
et al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La
Porta et al. (1998); Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders’ equity of the firm;
Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm in year t; and Size is measured
as the logarithm of sales of the firm
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Table IV. Test of differences in variables by listing
Panel A: US listings versus London listings
Variable

US listings
London listings
(mean value)
(mean value)
n = 88
n = 61
CIFAR
69.682
70.016
S&P score
45.691
52.395
Emerging
0.318
0.066
Anti-dir
3.909
3.967
Judicial
8.153
9.619
Liquidity
1.326
0.607
GNP
414.028
4,156.900
Leverage
2.375
4.023
Growth
0.069
-0.030
Size
9.968
7.883
Panel B: US listings versus non-cross-listings

Variable
CIFAR
S&P score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
Liquidity
GNP
Leverage
Growth
Size

US listings
(mean value)
n = 130
69.431
47.448
0.269
3.846
8.321
1.230
1,054.150
3.429
0.116
10.137

WilcoxonZ statistic

p-value
(Z-test)

p-value
(t-test)

-0.880
2.735
-3.677
-0.431
4.936
-4.137
9.389
3.189
-4.041
-7.206

0.189
0.003
0.000
0.333
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.001
<0.0001
<0.0001

0.190
0.004
0.000
0.334
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.001
<0.0001
<0.0001

p-value
(Z-test)

p-value
(t-test)

0.349
0.024
0.001
0.003
0.019
0.151
0.404
0.343
0.002
<0.0001

0.349
0.024
0.001
0.003
0.019
0.151
0.404
0.343
0.002
<0.0001

Non-cross-listed Wilcoxon(mean value)
Z statistic
n = 225
70.373
-0.388
45.548
1.983
0.440
-3.193
3.560
2.804
7.899
2.084
1.055
1.034
1,539.960
0.242
3.803
-0.405
0.073
2.851
8.693
5.375

Notes: CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score
is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country
is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-Dir is a measure of anti-director rights for
the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial
rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Liquidity is liquidity of
the capital market in the home country; GNP is gross national product of the country in
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm
in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm
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Table V. Logistic regression of cross-listing indicator on disclosure scores
(I)
Parameter
Estimate
Panel A: USA vs others
Intercept
11.079***
CIFAR
-0.122***
S&P score
CIF* S&P score
Emerging
-3.515***
Anti-dir
0.170
Judicial
-0.064
French
-0.155
German
-3.081
Liquidity
-0.099
LogGNP
-0.109
Leverage
Growth
Size
No. of observations
416

t-statistic

Estimate

2.578
-2.854

10.481
-0.297***
0.010
0.070***
-1.317*
-0.409
0.128
-0.180
-5.606***
0.458
0.672
-0.034*
0.260
0.646***
327

-5.404
0.541
-0.330
-0.193
-3.271
-0.330
-0.305

Log likelihood ratio X2

5.413
p-value
0.144
Panel B: USA vs London
Intercept
-331.675
CIFAR
3.890
S&P score
CIF* S&P score
Emerging
68.671
Anti-dir
-15.775
Judicial
7.409
French
18.488
German
-22.238
Liquidity
19.802
LogGNP
6.457
Leverage
Growth
Size
No. of observations 149
Log likelihood ratio X2
0.000
p-value
0.000

(II)

t-statistic
0.981
-2.664
0.510
2.558
-1.559
-0.873
0.535
-0.155
-3.763
0.874
1.071
-1.560
0.298
5.605

284.246
0.877
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-236.151
3.360
0.409
-0.398
46.328
-12.100
4.881
11.842
10.072
14.881
-2.996
-0.097
11.131**
0.362

0.000
0.000
1.148
-1.035
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.591
1.811
0.589

127
34.175
1.000

Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels, respectively; USind is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the
disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level
disclosure score; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country has high CIFAR
score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-dir is a measure of antidirector rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a
measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998);
French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system is French-based,
and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system
is Germanbased, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the
home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product of the country in
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm
in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm:
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Table VI. Two-stage least squares regression of cross-listing indicator on
disclosure scores
Variable
Panel A: model (1)
Intercept
CIFAR
S&P score
CIF* S&P score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
French
German
Liquidity
LogGNP
Leverage
Growth
Size
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
Panel B: model (2)
Intercept
Usind
CIFAR
Antidir
Judicial
French
German
Liquidity
LogGNP
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

Estimate

t-statistic

-26.229**
0.000
0.380**
-0.083*
2.822*
1.772**
0.225
6.722**
1.725
2.502**
-0.252
0.000
0.000
0.000
326
-0.009

-1.67
0.00
2.55
-1.91
1.98
2.07
0.87
2.27
0.89
2.27
-0.34
0.000
0.000
0.000

-9.519
3.669***
0.693***
-4.618***
0.615
-13.822***
-6.713
-3.983***
4.155***
326
0.632

-0.59
3.72
4.18
-4.40
0.93
-4.14
-1.60
-3.28
2.78

Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 per cent levels, respectively; USind is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the
disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level
disclosure score; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country has high CIFAR
score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-dir is a measure of antidirector rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a
measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998);
French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system is French based,
and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system
is German based, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the
home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product of the country in
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities
to stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the
firm in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm:
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Table VII. Two-stage least squares regression of cross-listing/exchange-listing
indicator on disclosure scores
Model (1a)
Variable

Estimate

t-stat.

Intercept

249.103***

CIFAR
S&P score
CIF*S&P
score
Emerging
Anti-dir
Judicial
French
German
Liquidity
LogGNP
Leverage
Growth
Size
No. of obs.
Adjusted R2

Model (1b)
t-stat.

-3.52

Estimate
-438.579

0.347***
0.225***
-0.109***

3.11
3.80
-3.31

2.057***
1.864***
-0.276
6.057***
-1.360
2.756***
1.605***
0.000
0.000
0.000
326
0.0109

3.15
3.27
-1.73
3.55
-1.46
3.65
2.97
0.00
0.00
0.00

Model (1c)
t-stat.

-0.49

Estimate
-119.765**

3.376
1.830
-1.183

0.49
0.49
-0.49

3.931
17.773
-2.822
62.502
-22.620
26.376
14.714
0.000
0.000
0.000
326
-0.0403

0.41
0.49
-0.47
0.49
-0.51
0.49
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.00

Model (1d)
t-stat.

-1.96

Estimate
-166.606

0.904*
0.505**
-0.219*

1.88
2.02
-1.93

1.315
0.550
-0.498

1.44
1.48
-1.47

4.140*
3.243*
-0.590
7.835*
-5.312*
5.495**
3.653*
0.000
0.000
0.000
326
-0.021

1.74
1.84
-1.3
1.86
-1.84
2.00
1.89
0.00
0.00
0.00

5.303
5.824
-0.722
-1.716
-8.783
9.357
7.047
0.000
0.000
0.000
326
-0.0304

1.33
1.46
-1.1
1.47
-1.4
1.48
1.46
0.00
0.00
0.00

-1.47

Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels, respectively; Exchind is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the firm is exchange-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; USind is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise;
CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the
firm-level disclosure score; Sub score 1 is the firmlevel disclosure score on ownership
structure and investor relations; Sub score 2 is the firm-level disclosure score on financial
transparency and information disclosure; Sub score 3 is the firm-level disclosure score on
board management structure and processes; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if
the country has a high CIFAR score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise;
Anti-dir is a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et
al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La
Porta et al. (1998); French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system
is French based, and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
country’s law system is German based, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the
capital market in the home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national
product of the country in which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage
is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the
change in the assets of the firm in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of
the firm:
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